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25.1 Introduction
The “Autonomous driving on the roads of the future: Villa Ladenburg Project” by the
Daimler und Benz-Stiftung looks at degrees of automation that will only become tech-
nically feasible in the distant future. The treatment of the legal questions in the present
chapter therefore draws heavily on the description of the use cases (see Chap. 2), which
begin to provide a concrete basis for evaluating individual issues. Uncertainties in pre-
dicting future technical developments can be expected and will have a commensurate
impact on the assumptions and conclusions of this chapter. The resulting uncertainty is
nevertheless unavoidable if one wants to press ahead with important interrelated issues.
This chapter is therefore intended as a contribution to the debate on societal aspects of
automated driving from a legal perspective and not as a legalistic evaluation of the subject.
The consideration will largely focus on the situation within the context of current German
law. The legal views expressed are those of the author and are based on nine years of
experience in the ﬁeld of driver assistance system research.
In terms of the underlying conception presented here, the societal dimension of
autonomous vehicles addressed in the present project goes well beyond the adjustments to
the legal framework currently being called for in Germany. The following will examine
the question of “societal acceptance” in the context of the legal questions raised by
autonomous vehicles. This line of investigation is not immediately obvious and covers
only a segment of the more thoroughgoing focus of the project (see Chap. 29).
Autonomous vehicles will presumably only attain widespread success when their
overall societal beneﬁts exceed the damage associated with them [1]. This early
hypothesis, asserted in regard to driver assistance systems, must be regarded in relation to
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the supremely important matter of trafﬁc safety. The requirement would be fulﬁlled if
overall trafﬁc safety were improved through advancements in the vehicle technology
(which, however, would not necessarily result in societal acceptance (see Chap. 29)).
Even today it may be surmised that autonomous vehicles which are controlled on the basis
of automated perception of the environment will not be capable of completely flawless
operation. It may therefore be concluded that even with autonomous vehicles, there will
continue to be individual severe damage incidents, which in extreme cases will include
multiple human deaths. The societal acceptance of autonomous vehicles therefore nec-
essarily depends upon societal acceptance of the consequences of these developments.
From a legal perspective, the fundamental issue at hand is understanding and accepting the
“effect of autonomous vehicles” in the public space as an independent “action” by
machine. This situation in road trafﬁc would indeed be totally new (other forms of
transportation such as automated, driverless trains generally strictly implement the con-
cept of separation between automated control and public space through physical barriers;
there are, apparently, very few exceptions,1 which, however, seek to exclude any resulting
dangers by means of exhaustive safety concepts nearly completely see [2]).
The novelty of autonomous vehicles as effective actors in the public space of road trafﬁc
from a legal standpoint can be demonstrated—as will be attempted in the following—in
order to highlight that societal acceptance of such a substantial change must indeed begin to
take root (see Chap. 30) before it can begin to have an impact on the adjustment of relevant
regulations.
25.2 Previous Work and Preliminary Considerations
To this author’s knowledge, the question of societal acceptance of driver assistance systems
with machine perception was ﬁrst raised by Homann [1] in the context of a working con-
ference inOctober 2002. The contents of that paper can be applied to the present examination
of autonomous vehicles. In this regard, it can only be concluded that the societal acceptance
issue thatwas discussed at the timewith regard to “newgeneration driver assistance systems”
has yet to become anchored in the public consciousness as a “problem,” although the systems
discussed back then have become available on the open market and sufﬁciently widespread
to reveal the existence of any actual problems. This is presumably due to the fact that to date,
spectacular negative effects resulting from such systems (as could be imagined in the case of
emergency braking assistance, for example) have not been recorded. One reason for this
could be that the systems do indeed function (almost) flawlessly. A more differentiated
explanatory approach, however, is that any such interventions in the control of the vehicle
1RUBIN project for the automation of the U2 and U3 subway lines in Nuremberg: Provisional
mixed operation of automated and conventionally controlled trains was implemented on a route
section between Rathenauplatz and Rothenburger Strasse. Moreover, the concept does not employ a
physical barrier along the platforms, but rather a sensor-based platform safety system.
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only occur extremely briefly in very accident-proximate situations. This suggests the use of a
technical variant that only intervenes when the evaluation of the environment recognition
system determines a very high probability that an intervention is indeed necessary, thus
reducing negative effects to aminimum. It must also be taken into account that the driver still
has the duty to perform all requisite control functions. Thus the driver potentially remains
available as a comprehensive fallback level in all cases of non-activation. The result of these
considerations is the relativelyminor signiﬁcance of such functions not only in terms of their
share of active time in the overall control of the vehicle but also with regard to the reliability
expected of them. Such functions can therefore only be used in a very limited capacity in
conjunction with independent or autonomous vehicle control systems: The subordinate
signiﬁcance and a tightly circumscribed “ﬁeld of action” of a function lead to a strengthening
of the driver’s role. This is presumably an important reason why the discussion regarding
societal acceptance has not taken place thus far.
There is little reason to believe, however, that societal acceptance will play an equally
minor role in the case of autonomous vehicles: If one takes the representative use cases
used as the basis for the current project as a baseline (see Chap. 2), it becomes clear that
they demonstrate a very high degree of automation. The “automated driving capability” of
these use cases as a reference value is deﬁned in greater detail in terms of “capabilities of
perception, cognition, behavioral decisions and behavior execution” (see underlying
deﬁnitions in Chap. 2). A machine-based “autonomy” of the vehicle emerges which
makes it possible to speak of “driving robots” “as a subject… analogous to the role of the
driver in the vehicles of today” (see Chap. 2). At this point it becomes clear that we are
speaking of a very fundamental shift that will be accompanied by the introduction of such
automated decisions in the public space.
Not much can be said about the question of societal acceptance of autonomous
automated driving capabilities from a legal standpoint. However, what legal regulations
will presumably reflect to a high degree is what can be regarded as amenable to consensus
on the societal level—an assumption which can be regarded as justiﬁed, at the very least
where individual regulations are not discussed and scrutinized by a wide swath of the
public. Comparing autonomous vehicles with current law shows that the spirit of current
regulations does indeed not cover independent “performance” by machines in the public
space (understood as behavioral decisions and behavior execution as a new sense of
automated action; see above).
Laws should be abstractly/generally applicable to all life situations. This maxim also
fundamentally applies to the stipulations of trafﬁc law. But when changes to the realities
of life emerge which cause previously fundamental presumptions to lose their validity, as
would be the case in the eventuality of autonomous vehicles with decision-making
capacities in the public space, this can only be represented through an application of the
law. It is possible to precisely describe the emergent change and bring the overarching
fundamental values of our society—such as basic rights—into the argument, which can
provide a framework which will presumably outlive the changes and set the parameters for
development.
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25.3 The Current Traffic Situation as a Starting Point
Fundamental state duties even with regard to road trafﬁc accidents can be traced back to
the constitution. In view of the hazards associated with road trafﬁc, the basic rights
relating to life and physical integrity [protected by article 2, paragraph 2, clause 1 of
Germany’s Fundamental Law (GG)] are paramount. The scope of protection afforded by
the basic right to life includes protection for all (universal fundamental right) not only
against targeted homicide, but also against behaviors that may unintentionally (unintended
interventions such as the effects of accidents) cause death. The state’s duty to provide
protection is comprehensive and also affords protection against illicit interventions by
third parties. This ultimately leads, where interventions cannot be justiﬁed, to a state duty
to prohibit such interventions, for example by establishing rule of law [3].
Here a discrepancy between the realities of life in society and constitutionally grounded
rights comes into focus. Notable in particular is the fact that “trafﬁc safety [is barely
discussed], although the still large number of trafﬁc deaths and permanently severely
injured accident victims provide ample reason to do just that” [3]. Indeed, in the media
major trafﬁc accidents are regularly treated as relatively insigniﬁcant matters of merely
regional interest. The phenomenon that emerges from this view, namely that the dangers
associated with the current trafﬁc situation, excites so little interest and plays such a minor
role in the socio-political discussion [4], which can at least be seen as an indicator of broad
societal acceptance of this state of affairs.
At the same time, the duty to protect vis-à-vis the “risks of technology” is critically
important with regard to road trafﬁc as well. Statistics are recorded on (severe) road trafﬁc
accidents (as per section 5, paragraph 3 of the Law on the Statistics of Road Trafﬁc
Accidents (StVUnfStatG), with research conducted by the Federal Highway Research
Institute), which enables precise monitoring of trafﬁc safety trends and accident causes
(bearing in mind that the number of road trafﬁc deaths has shown an overall decline for
many years). Yet the signiﬁcance of trafﬁc safety extends far beyond this as a critical
factor in trafﬁc policy overall, including in (but not limited to) the establishment and
adaptation of trafﬁc-related (driver permission, vehicle technology, behavioral and many
other) legal regulations, but also in the design of roadways, road maintenance, road
equipment, and so on. In spite of these various efforts and ongoing improvements, the
status quo of 3339 deaths and 374,142 injuries (in Germany in 2013) remains a reality
with which no one can truly be satisﬁed.
Finally, from a very fundamentally legal perspective, the question arises as to the
constitutional rationale for these interventions in the fundamental rights to life and physical
integrity. It can be argued on the basis of the mobility requirements of other fundamental
rights-bearers associated with motor vehicle trafﬁc and their willingness to subject them-
selves to the concomitant hazards of such trafﬁc on account of the beneﬁts associated with
it. But even that is not universally valid, in particular if one considers that the dangers that
flow from motor vehicles, in view of the considerable operational hazards in comparison to
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non-motorized trafﬁc participants, does not allow for any utterly unambiguous argumen-
tation: While with motorized trafﬁc participants it can be argued that they are prepared to
accept the increased danger associated with motor vehicles which they themselves create,
this cannot be extended to pedestrians or bicyclists [3]. That said, pedestrians and bicy-
clists, with 557 and 354 deaths, and 30,897 and 71,066 injuries, respectively (for 2013) [5],
represent a signiﬁcant share of all road trafﬁc accidents in Germany.
Nevertheless, it seems probable that across broad sections of the public, there will be a
signiﬁcant degree of consensus that the consequences of road trafﬁc are acceptable in view
of the mobility needs of society. If one were to venture the thought experiment of
imagining signiﬁcant limitations of motor vehicle trafﬁc in the interest of improving trafﬁc
safety, this would at the same time mean failing to take account of some other important
societal needs: Immediately effective (radical) changes would obviously be associated
with substantial limitations on individual (motorized) mobility, as well as (and not only)
the general freedom of action protected in the Basic Law under section 2, paragraph 1
GG). Because such an approach would be extreme, its proportionality comes under
scrutiny: Identifying any such measures which would be suitable to the task in view of
roadway driving of a total of 724 billion kilometers (in 2013 in Germany) [5] and yet not
result in severe consequences for the economic development of the country, the ability of
people to carry out their jobs, the provision of public services and much more, is virtually
inconceivable. Against this backdrop, the probability of a majority being in favor of
restrictions with regard to motor vehicle trafﬁc is low. The currently practiced approach of
continuous improvement of trafﬁc safety thus emerges—as the positive development
heretofore attests—as successful, realistic and exemplary. The aforementioned appeal
from a constitutional standpoint for a more vigorous debate on trafﬁc safety does not in
itself call into question the existing legal situation with respect to road trafﬁc, but instead
highlights, at this stage, the importance of trafﬁc safety efforts in this context.
But if one carries the pursuit of causes of the comparatively poor performance of road
trafﬁc compared to other forms of transportation, it is worthwhile to consider a funda-
mentally unique factor with regard to road trafﬁc. With the legal deﬁnition of roads as
“public goods in public use … [which] are made immediately available to the public for
the established purpose without special permission”, including recognition of roads as a
“multi-purpose institution” [6], attention is rightly drawn to a characteristic in which road
trafﬁc as we know it today—including the associated accidents—is rooted. As public
goods in public use, roads exist not only for the purpose of changing locations (trafﬁc in
the narrower sense), but also serve to enable commercial and communicative trafﬁc (trafﬁc
in a broader sense) [7]. Ultimately this deﬁnition of the purpose of “roads” gives rise to a
multiplicity of trafﬁc situations understood in terms of diversity of trafﬁc participants,
trafﬁc scenarios, sudden, unexpected events and conditions and developments between
trafﬁc participants on roads. A comparable variety of possible interactions in which nearly
the entire population is involved in some form or another and which would be associated
with a comparable risk of injury is not to be found in any other area of life. Roads
therefore have a multifarious function which typically is not the case for the space
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occupied by other forms of transportation. This functional diversity has a signiﬁcant
impact with respect to the circumstances that must be considered in the context of vehicle
control: The requirements for the safe conduct of the driving activity are complex and
diverse in nature. The driver of a motor vehicle is called upon to perform comprehensive
perception of the trafﬁc situation, make decisions and execute appropriate actions on that
basis, particularly with regard to hazard recognition. In terms of the legal framework, at
present this task is primarily regulated through laws governing behavior and driving
license requirements. Just what signiﬁcance the diversity and complexity of the task when
performed by an automated vehicle control apparatus will take on in terms of legal
categories will be examined in the following sections.
25.4 Assessing Autonomous Driving
Against this backdrop, this project on “autonomous driving” raises the fundamental and
far-reaching legal question as to how autonomous vehicles could be integrated into this
agglomeration of factors in legal terms. A starting point for answering this question—as
mentioned above—would be to re-examine and describe the characteristic of such vehi-
cles as “driving robots” or “subject” analogous to the driver (see Chap. 2) and lay out the
associated consequences of such an approach for real-life situations.
25.4.1 Current State of Driver Assistance Systems Available
on the Market
To date, an action and decision quality exists only in the case of human action (which
always exists at least in the sense of the driver’s own perception and decisions—or at least
in the sense of a continuous duty in this respect). In fact this is the still current minimum
requirement in terms of driver participation in controlling the vehicle: Current driver
assistance systems in a broader sense can only aid the driver in controlling the vehicle, not
act as a replacement. At the present moment (August 2014), a division of labor between
the driver and the driver assistance system would be possible involving active control of
the longitudinal and lateral steering of the vehicle (on the basis of independent, automated
environment perception). But this control system currently possesses no independent
decision quality: Rather, it is predicated at all times on the driver’s immediate intervention
and resumption of control of the vehicle if required for whatever reason—for instance due
to faulty perception of the environment by the system. Thus the driver maintains a
superordinate role and responsibility, making the vehicle control by the system appear
derivative and subordinate. From a technical view of this division of labor, this is cur-
rently absolutely necessary, as the driver assistance systems currently available on the
market are not capable of independently recognizing that all system limits have been
reached. One characteristic warning (of several) in the instructions for the “DISTRONIC
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PLUS” system (an adaptive cruise control and thus a longitudinal control system of
Daimler Corp.) reads as follows (as of August 2014):
WARNING
DISTRONIC PLUS and the active blind-spot assistant are only aids designed to assist you
while driving.
They cannot act as a replacement for your attention. Responsibility for regulating the
distance to other vehicles, for the driving speed and timely braking rests with you. Always
pay attention to the trafﬁc situation and your environment. Otherwise you might recognize
hazards too late, cause an accident and injure yourself and others. [8]
From this warning—which can be found in similar form with other currently available
driver assistance systems—illustrates very clearly that the system can only assist the driver
if the driver maintains uninterrupted attention to his/her own perception of the trafﬁc
situation. All of the control processes automated by the system must be checked by the
driver and overridden as needed through appropriate control actions by the driver.
Driver assistance systems are therefore described from a control engineering per-
spective as a “redundant-parallel” form of the division of labor combined with the same
tasks [9]. This description in terms of division of labor is indeed appropriate from a legal
standpoint, but does not say anything about where decision-making authority lies in case
of contradictory performance of the task. With current driver assistance systems, the
authority to override the driver assistance system at any time always rests with the human
driver. The proper use of the system that emerges from the operating instructions is always
directed towards observing and assuring the proper performance of the system and making
appropriate changes if the system is not acting as it should.
If the longitudinal and lateral control of a vehicle—i.e. the two fundamental aspects of
the driving function in terms of control—are both automated at the same time, this
division of labor is described as partially automated [10]. This does not change the fact,
however, that such systems are not capable of recognizing system limits on their own and
are thus necessarily subjugated to the redundant-parallel perception, decision-making and
action of a human driver (understood as performance of authority in the spirit of “override
in the case of any recognizable need”). Thus with respect to automation which is subject
to monitoring by the driver, the aspect of “authority” attains the legally decisive
signiﬁcance.
The result, then, is that with regard to the driver assistance systems on the market to
date, there is never an independent, but only a derivative action and decision quality
residing in the vehicle control system, which only occurs under the complete authority of
the driver, who continuously monitors it according to regulations.
25.4.2 Autonomous Driving
The matter is fundamentally different in the case of autonomous driving, which is
examined here by means of four representative use cases (see Chap. 2). All four use cases
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envision a driving robot that assumes the vehicle control function. Even the “Interstate
Pilot Using Driver for Extended Availability” use case, which clearly recalls current driver
assistance systems, does not indeed require that the “driver” actually perform any func-
tions during automated driving that would correspond to our current deﬁnition of a
“driver”. This emerges in the clear formulation that the driver “becomes a simple pas-
senger during automated driving”.
Thus autonomous driving essentially envisions a situation in which the
redundant-parallel performance of tasks by the driver and the system gives way to—
potentially temporally and spatially delimited—independent automated vehicle control by
the system. The person now ﬁttingly referred to merely as the “vehicle user” does still
retain a “dominant” intervention capability in the aforementioned “Interstate Pilot” use
case, which does not fundamentally differ from the “authority” in the case of driver
assistance systems described in Sect. 25.4.1. However, the basis for performance is rather
likely to be lacking: As soon as the role of the driver changes so dramatically that not only
performance of the task but also observation of the trafﬁc situation and the evaluation of
the automated control decisions which are based on it are dropped, the signiﬁcance of this
“dominance” or “authority” is inevitably limited. Thus even where the vehicle user is
paying attention to the situation, there is de facto no basis for performance of this
“dominance” or “authority”. In the case of the two use cases distinguished by the spatial
absence of the vehicle user (see the “Autonomous Valet Parking” and “Vehicle on
Demand” representative use cases in Chap. 2), the lack of a basis for actually exerting
“dominance” or “authority” is even more evident.
The lack of a basis for immediate observation of the trafﬁc situation as a starting point
for vehicle control can only be interpreted as de facto independence or “autonomy” of the
automated control system. The therefore decisive signiﬁcance of the autonomy of the
automated vehicle control system in the present context has naturally found its way into
the name of the underlying project.
25.5 Fundamental Legal Questions vis-à-vis Autonomous
Driving
Legal questions related to autonomous driving cannot, as touched on in Sect. 25.2,
adequately, let alone exhaustively, be addressed in terms of the current legal framework.
The reason for this is that in their creation and ongoing development, the legal bases of
road trafﬁc law could only take account of considerations that were in need of regulation
at a given time. In the ﬁeld of public road trafﬁc, the question of autonomous vehicles has
not arisen thus far—including in the context of driver assistance systems currently
available on the market (see Sect. 25.4.1): Heretofore it could always be assumed that a
driver would execute vehicle control at least in the sense of redundant-parallel task
performance. If one looks at autonomous driving, by contrast, there is a shift of funda-
mental signiﬁcance towards independent automated vehicle control.
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25.5.1 Risks of Automation
For autonomous vehicles, it is assumed that “hardware failures and software failures …
[can] also occur with autonomously driving vehicles,” although such vehicles developed
“with state-of-the-art technology” are classiﬁed as “at least as reliable and safe … as
current conventional vehicles are.” The following considerations also demonstrate,
however, that there is a great deal of uncertainty in this regard since the “success rate” in
terms of vehicle control is assumed to be “similar to the quality and success rate of human
drivers”, but at present this represents only a conservative expert opinion which can only
serve as a basis for discussion for the present project (see Chap. 2). Thus the performance
of automated vehicle control systems cannot be deﬁnitively assessed; it may be assumed,
however, that the risk of automation will remain, but at the same time will not be higher
than the risk resulting from human vehicle control.
25.5.1.1 The Automation Risks Against the Backdrop
of Fundamental Rights
If we now examine the aforementioned potential automation risk in light of the situation
of today’s road trafﬁc as it pertains to the fundamental rights to life and physical integrity
(see Sect. 25.3), it becomes clear that the shift from human control to automated vehicle
control would presumably be regarded as “critical to the exercise of fundamental rights”
[11]. Due to the signiﬁcant intervention that any such new automation risk would mean
with respect to the fundamental rights to life and physical integrity, it must be regarded as
probable that a decision regarding the allowance of automated vehicles and thus of an
automation risk flowing from automated control systems in road trafﬁc would fall under
the purview of the legislative authority. The lawmaking body would bear the duty of
making key decisions itself, flowing from the democratic principle and the rule of law.
The critical provisions for the protection of fundamental rights should therefore not be left
in ﬁeld of action or decision-making authority of the executive [12]. This argumentation
places the focus squarely on the novelty of such an automation risk because it would
revolutionize vehicle control in general. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that
the most realistic scenario for the introduction of automated vehicle control is gradual,
step-by-step implementation by means of continual improvement of driver assistance
systems available today (see Chap. 2). This raises the question of whether the transition to
automated vehicle control will still be regarded as “critical” at the time when the decision
is actually made. The Federal Constitutional Court has traditionally been rather restrained
with respect to the parliamentary prerogative regarding the fundamental rights to life and
physical integrity and has been satisﬁed to let questionable types of risks to life be covered
by the legislative will expressed in the atomic energy act (Atomgesetz) [3, 13] (more
speciﬁcally the “breeder technology” in that case). It is also not necessary to explicitly
name the risks and consequences of road trafﬁc that impact the fundamental rights to life
and physical integrity (so there is no unconstitutionality of the road trafﬁc act (StVG)
flowing from this alone in current practice) [13]. Thus the question remains whether the
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road trafﬁc act in its present form can encompass the novel quality of automated control.
At the time of this writing (August 2014), the novelty and independence of the automated
decision quality raises considerable doubts.
Should the underlying assumptions and relationships prove correct, the question of
allowing for an automated control risk in public road trafﬁc would have to be regulated by
formal law (the so-called proviso of formal law). The legislator would be free to permit
risks that remain “below the danger threshold” and which can therefore be justiﬁed, also in
the light of freedom on the part of the person who causes the risk. However, the legislator
is not restricted to this and can also become active below the danger threshold as a means
of minimizing risk, insofar as this is still considered proportionate under constitutional law
[3]. In terms of the magnitude of a potential automation risk, then, it seems—not least in
view of the indicative effect of the situation in current road trafﬁc—realistic to presume a
level of safety and thus also regulatory authority on the part of the legislator that remains
within the scope of “at least as reliable and safe as current vehicles” (see Chap. 2).
25.5.1.2 Liability of the Product Manufacturer for Autonomously
Operating Vehicle Control?
Product liability on the part of the manufacturer with fully-automated systems (see
Chap. 2 for classiﬁcation of the present use cases as “fully automated”) could be deter-
mined in large part through the intended use of the product as deﬁned by the manufac-
turer. Insofar as system functions—as in the case of full automation—no longer envision a
necessary role for the driver with regard to vehicle control, it could in turn be concluded
that the acceptance of prima facie evidence in the event of accident damage is proper: If
(accident) damage occurs in the course of automated driving, the question arises whether
this can be attributed causally to an underlying product defect (insofar as the relevant
cause is not due to an intervention by the driver in the form of an override action or
exclusively the result of improper behavior on the part of another trafﬁc participant—all
within the context of the applicable burden of presentation/proof in civil suits) [10]. In the
ﬁnal result, the decisive question would be whether an incorrect automated control
decision could ultimately be classiﬁed as a product defect and thus that in practically all
cases of incorrect control, civil liability on the part of the manufacturer could be assumed.
In that case, the manufacturer—in addition to the vehicle owner (see also [10])—would
(almost) always bear the liability risk with respect to civil law for the automation risk
associated with the automated action. In view of the expanded possibilities for inter-
vention of automated vehicle control (see Sect. 25.5.2 for more on this), the scope of
application for control-relevant errors would actually even expand vis-à-vis the driver.
Whether this conclusion is appropriate, however, is another question: To a great extent,
the argumentation follows the assumption that the cause of accidents today is regularly
due to improper control decisions on the part of the driver. However, the (in future
potentially automated) vehicle control may represent only one of multiple possible
accident causes.
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Current road trafﬁc law still seems to be shaped by a different fundamental under-
standing. This becomes clear for instance in the current edition of the road trafﬁc act, which
presumes the existence of “unavoidable events” (which in section 17, paragraph 3 of the
road trafﬁc act (StVG) still play a role in assigning the respective shares of responsibility
for damage between motor vehicles). It must be emphasized, however, that of the cases
currently encompassed by this, from a purely scientiﬁc standpoint and in consideration of
the current state of technical capabilities it may be presumed that only some of these
incidents will in future be considered “unavoidable”. Even so, to date the understanding of
this legal term is only limited insofar as the “the greatest possible care” and the “behavior of
an ‘ideal driver’” in terms of average performance expectations (as opposed to an imputed
“super-driver”) are sufﬁcient [14]. (There is evidently a different underlying idea here: the
question as to responsibility for an accident, not scientiﬁc causality for its occurrence).
Consistent application of the question of scientiﬁc causality could mean that only a
subsection of damages occurring during automated vehicle control would in fact be
traceable to a defective control system (or some other product defect). This would ulti-
mately fundamentally call into question the aforementioned inference of damage due to
the existence of a product defect during automated control. The open question in this
context is therefore to what extent the current “road trafﬁc system” represents an inde-
pendently relevant cause for accident damage (vis-à-vis control decisions that might be
automated).
25.5.2 “Dilemma Situations”
In the context of the legal discussion, the suggestive term “dilemma situation” encom-
passes two interconnected aspects which can pointedly describe the characteristic prop-
erties of automated action and illustrate the consequences of a worst-case scenario of such
a transformation with exceptional clarity: ﬁrst, the expansion of the scope of intervention
in the control of the vehicle in time-critical situations and second, the question as to the
implementation of an automated control decision within the scope of fundamental rights.
To begin with, we must fundamentally question the existence of “dilemma situations” in
road trafﬁc. It is particularly unclear whether the underlying thought model of unavoid-
ability is compelling. In road trafﬁc, individual cases provide diverse, discreet and strongly
situation-dependent opportunities to intervene in vehicle control. Preceding alternative
control decisions in road trafﬁc thus offer—potentially, this would have to be examined in
greater detail—the possibility of taking action to prevent the occurrence of an unavoidable
situation in which damage was inevitable. It would seem, then, that the possibility of
preventing unavoidable situations through anticipatory vehicle control behavior cannot be
excluded. On the other hand, it could turn out that certain hazards in road trafﬁc arise from
its very nature and are indeed not avoidable (for example due to the plenitude of possible
interactions of differently protected trafﬁc participants). In exceptional cases, the potential
coincidence of two possible damages would then need to be assumed realistic, requiring a
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consideration of “dilemma situations”. In legal categories, the question as to relevant
accident causes is thus brought up which is subject to scientiﬁc determination both in terms
of internal (vehicle control-dependent) and external (trafﬁc system-dependent) factors.
Irrespective of the result of this theoretical examination of vehicle control in road
trafﬁc, discussion-worthy aspects emerge from the consideration: Using “dilemma situa-
tions” makes it possible to delineate a framework with respect to fundamental rights for
automated control decisions. If one presumes the existence of “dilemma situations”, it also
emerges that a limitation of the manufacturer’s responsibility could be called for in these
cases because damages due to control actions would then be just as unavoidable as they
would be in the case of the existence of independent risks flowing from the “road trafﬁc
system” per se (see Sect. 25.5.1).
Finally, it should be noted that “dilemma situations” are also addressed in various
forms in the discussion of ethical aspects, where they are likewise used as a means of
illuminating and examining the overarching ethical considerations (see Chap. 4).
25.5.2.1 Expansion of the Scope of Influence
The conceptual model of “dilemma situations” for autonomous vehicles is based on the
working hypothesis that certain acutely accident-proximate situations could still be
affected by the use of automated vehicle control: In many cases it could therefore be
possible to “save” materially endangered legal interests literally at the last second. With
the current state of technology (and exclusively human vehicle control), these situations
always require consideration of the driver’s reaction time [14]. The thus delayed control
action can, depending on the case, influence the occurrence of an accident or its conse-
quences. In fact this working hypothesis, taken in the context of a transition to automated
control decisions, is by no means far-fetched. Further, it may also be assumed that another
beneﬁt could be achieved, namely that an automated control system could consider
alternative control options, such as avoiding rather than braking for an acutely endangered
pedestrian, which average drivers seldom succeed in doing [15]. One salient working
hypothesis underlying the “dilemma situations” is therefore that automated vehicle control
could lead to controlling trafﬁc situations which were previously uncontrolled or only
controlled after a delay.
25.5.2.2 The Automated Control Decision
A further assumption in the “dilemma situation” conceptual model which builds on the
preceding takes account of the novel automated “decision quality” of an autonomous
vehicle control system. This point of view is explicitly expressed in the designation of the
“driving robot” as a “subject” which is revealed—with all due care in this regard—in the
underlying deﬁnitions of the current project (see Chap. 2). In order to highlight this effect
and argue the ethical dimension of automated control decision-making, a decision
dilemma is brought in to accentuate the underlying quandary. This ampliﬁcation is not to
be regarded as a completely unrealistic scenario and worthy of discussion per se because it
deals with the societal acceptance of a wide-ranging decision-making quality which is
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hereby brought into focus. This automated decision-making quality can, in individual
cases—as constructed in the “dilemma situations”—impact the right of the (acutely
endangered) individual to life and physical integrity and is thus not fundamentally dif-
ferent than in the case of the hazards affecting fundamental rights in road trafﬁc as it exists
today (see also Sect. 25.3). The major difference lies only in the underlying automated
control.
25.5.2.3 Critical Analysis of the “Dilemma Situation”
In any theoretical analysis of the possible consequences of automated control decisions, it
is only possible to do justice to the matter if it is made clear that the “dilemma situation” in
the form of the “decision dilemma,” insofar as it exists at all, represents an absolutely
exceptional case. In the interest of proper assessment, it must therefore be stated at the
outset that this could only be an exceedingly rare exception.
The assumption underlying the dilemma is that there is no alternative to damaging two
essentially equivalent objects of legal protection in a concrete individual case although the
automated vehicle control system has taken all alternative possible control decisions into
account. But even if in the concrete situation—in consideration of the control behavior
prior to the hazard becoming acute—there were no alternative to damage, relevant
alternative causes to the control behavior in the antecedent causal chain could be con-
sidered. It therefore seems plausible to assume that dangers may not reside exclusively in
the vehicle control, but indeed inhere in the nature of road trafﬁc in itself and thus flow
from the complexity and variety of possible situations in the “road trafﬁc system” as
described in Sect. 25.3. This seems particularly probable where one considers the influ-
ence of driving speed, for example, which in most cases presumably represents a nec-
essary cause (in the scientiﬁc sense) in the occurrence of trafﬁc accidents. But the
“normal” driving speed is also simultaneously a component of the current understanding
of the “road trafﬁc system” and indeed largely deﬁnes it in some parts. The image of
today’s road appears decidedly risky in individual cases: It is therefore appropriate to
question whether in individual situations—for example when driving past a pedestrian—a
risk exists [16] that could be adapted to address existing accident risks in road trafﬁc.
25.5.2.4 “Dilemma Situations” Against the Backdrop of Fundamental
Rights
The legal evaluation of “dilemma situations” should take its starting point in the over-
arching legal framework, the fundamental rights. In the area of fundamental right to life
and physical integrity nothing of fundamental signiﬁcance changes due to the transition
from human vehicle control to automated agency. In particular, it does not give rise to a
“targeted” intervention in life or physical integrity, which in light of the importance of
these objects of legal protection as the highest value and their fundamental signiﬁcance
would be impossible to justify for all practical purposes [3]. While every control decision
is predetermined under particular external conditions by the programming of the
respective system and thus is not random, as will need to be discussed in the context of
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product liability as well, this does not in fact represent the speciﬁcation of a particular
course of action. Rather, the programming of an automated driving function (only)
speciﬁes which factors should be taken into account so that among multiple alternatives,
the one which completely avoids damage, if possible, or causes the least damage, can be
selected. It is particularly this situation-dependent consideration of alternative courses of
action which represents the decisive added value of automated vehicle control, which was
described as “Expansion of the scope of influence” through automated control in
Sect. 25.5.2.1. Thus in the context of programming, no actual control decisions are made,
but (only) abstract criteria for control decisions in individual cases speciﬁed. This illus-
trates that ultimately it is still an abstract risk that is posed by automated control in road
trafﬁc. In terms of the fundamental rights, automated control would therefore not be
handled differently than human vehicle control, which poses the risks presented in
Sect. 25.3. Thus the associated unintentional damages to objects of protection (see [3])
which are equally caused by accidents under automated control in road trafﬁc where an
automation risk is assumed (see Sect. 25.5.1) should not be evaluated any differently than
current risks in road trafﬁc from the standpoint of the fundamental right to life and
physical integrity.
One aspect, however, should be given particular attention from a fundamental rights
perspective: If it emerges that automated perception of the environment is sufﬁcient to
recognize non-motorized trafﬁc participants (pedestrians and bicyclists) as such, their
protection would have to be given particular weight in the action variants established to
handle such situations (see the argumentation in Sect. 25.3).
The decision dilemma described by the term “dilemma situation” between two
equivalent objects of legal protection cannot be resolved, however, against the backdrop
of the fundamental right to life and physical integrity: any trade-off between two equiv-
alent values or, with regard to life, “absolute” fundamental right of other fundamental
rights-bearers in terms of constitutional protection [3] is absolutely impermissible. From a
legal standpoint, therefore—if one assumes the actual existence of such “dilemma situ-
ations” in reality—there can be no contribution in the sense of a decision flowing from the
current state of the fundamental rights dogma; rather, a novel question in need of an
answer would be raised. It would therefore be of some importance to clarify the question
of whether “dilemma situations” actually occur in this manner, and in particular whether
the relevant cause of their occurrence can actually be traced back to the automated control
decision and not to some inherent risk within the “road trafﬁc system”—for example due
to the driving speeds in certain situations (see also Sect. 25.5.2.3). If it emerged that
“dilemma situations” exist and that their relevant cause resides in automated control, it
would be essential to make this question transparent and—presuming societal acceptance
of an automation risk—conduct a debate about it. It would presumably be necessary to
create a catalog of recognized decision criteria for such situations.
In all of this it would be essential to bear in mind that the question only arises in the
ﬁrst place through the expansion of the scope of intervention (see Sect. 25.5.2.1), which in
most cases without a “dilemma” would lead to an improvement over the current situation.
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The scientiﬁc comparison of the automated decision dilemma with the driver of today will
in all likelihood demonstrate that in otherwise identical situations, the driver is not
regarded as culpable, not least in consideration of the moment of shock accorded to the
driver (see [14]). There is likewise no distinction between the scenarios with regard to
“dilemma situations” in that damage occurs in either case. The reason for addressing the
question would thus be due to the decidedly welcome development that technological
advancements had made it possible to influence such situations and thus to save acutely
endangered objects of legal protection. The weight of this argument will presumably carry
the day in the end.
25.5.3 Possibility of Override by Passengers
The question of an override possibility of vehicles results from past discussions on driver
assistance systems, which in large part draws on the concrete formulations of the Vienna
Convention on Road Trafﬁc of 1968 [17], which is still valid as of this writing (August
2014). Although this was not speciﬁcally mentioned, the underlying thought is neverthe-
less related to the question as to the duties of the driver in case of fully-automated vehicle
control, which with respect to the applicable law in Germany has been described as
contradictory [10]. The context can be described in terms of the concept of “dominance” or
“authority”, which was taken as a basis in the “use cases” discussed in the present project
(see Chap. 2). All four representative use cases envision a role for the driver or passenger in
vehicle control, which diminishes as the scope of autonomy rises since other factors must
be given precedence in the context of functional implementation. Even the representative
use case examined here with the lowest degree of autonomy, the “Interstate Pilot Using
Driver for Extended Availability” use case envisions that the driver “becomes a mere
passenger during autonomous driving” such that he/she “[can] pursue another activity”.
Thus even here there is a complete lack of a basis for an override capability at any time,
which from the outset has always been regarded as factually (and not just technically)
necessary. The factual override possibility by the driver was a reformulation of the initially
uncontroversial “ﬁnal decision authority of the driver” in driver assistance systems. This
represented the subordinate role of driver assistance systems vis-à-vis the driver in vehicle
control, where the system was regarded as having only a derivative authority to act and take
decisions (see Sect. 25.4.1). Autonomous vehicles call this entire situation into question,
such that it seems inadvisable to derive interpretations for future application from regu-
lations that assume a human driver is taking part in vehicle control. This fundamental shift
to independent automated action is already described in Sect. 25.4.2.
With regard to fundamental rights, however, one aspect does bear a brief mention: The
liberties of passengers of autonomous vehicles speciﬁed in art. 2 of the German Funda-
mental Law provide an overall framework which—to the extent relevant in the present
case—applies in particular to the right to personal mobility and personal freedom (see [3]).
The limitations on these liberties resulting from autonomous vehicles do not seem as of
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this writing to have been fundamentally called into question, as long as the passengers
always have the possibility of causing the vehicle to stop at the nearest safe and appro-
priate location.
25.5.4 Error Compensation Capability in Autonomous Driving
A “basic presumption” of the present project is that the use cases are deployed at the
considered time in a mixed operation of transportation systems with different levels of
automation ... ranging from “driver-only” to “assisted” to “fully automated” (see Chap. 2).
This leads to the requirement that autonomous vehicles integrate in the existing trafﬁc
system.
In the case of conventional vehicle control, as in the case of currently available driver
assistance systems (in the broadest sense), which never enjoy actual autonomy (see
Sect. 25.4.1), the German road trafﬁc regulations (StVO) are applicable without exception.
Drivers thus ﬁnd themselves confronted with conflicting priorities of the “principle of trust”
and “defensive driving”. The “Principle of Trust” means that properly behaving trafﬁc
participants under normal circumstances do not need to take all possible (rare) trafﬁc vio-
lations by others into account as a preventive measure. The “Principle of Trust” is necessary
to maintain trafﬁc flow. At the same time, the driver is called upon to “drive defensively” (to
contribute to trafﬁc safety) and thus apply more than the prescribed care (which in fact
means partially hedging one’s trust in the proper trafﬁc behavior of other drivers) without
this “fundamentally” undermining the principle of legitimate expectation [14]. Just how
these requirements are understood in individual cases, could be inferred from court rulings
in Germany. However, the continental European norm of systematized statutory law can
provide but a degree of orientation in this regard, but no precedence for individual cases,
which ultimately means that the value of any such aggregation of rulings is limited.
It must therefore ultimately be required of “mixed operation” vehicles that they meet
(at least) the same standards required of drivers in order to ensure that they do not, at the
minimum, cause any new hazards. In a precise description of the requirements on an error
compensation capability, it must be noted that a signiﬁcant degree of imprecision remains.
If one translates the current legal requirements in road trafﬁc into a deﬁnition of the
capabilities required of an autonomous control function, it can only be asserted with
sufﬁcient certainty that autonomous vehicles must absolutely have error compensation
capabilities. Autonomous vehicles would have to be able to take clearly identiﬁable
inappropriate behavior by other trafﬁc participants into account and adapt the automated
control accordingly. According to current law, how this is achieved is left up to the
judgment of the driver in individual cases. Just implementing this requirement alone from
a technical standpoint would require an extremely sophisticated environment recognition
capability and extremely complex decision-making processes; but these are—including in
the case of the driver—not speciﬁcally deﬁned, but rather taken as given in the context of
the requisite suitability and permission to drive [18]. This lack of speciﬁcity concerning
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the requirements could therefore prove too difﬁcult for implementation in the form of an
automated control system.
In light of the uncertainty resulting from the antagonistic demand of “defensive driving”,
the only remaining option at this point is the—potentially trafﬁc-flow-compromising—
overfulﬁllment of the error compensation capability to the extent of total risk exclusion.
This leaves the question, however, of whether a signiﬁcant restriction of the trafﬁc flow
would indeed be expected: due to the aforementioned expanded scope of intervention of
automated control (see Sect. 25.5.2), automated vehicle control could actually provemuch
more capable than a human driver. This advantage, which is presently unmeasurable, could
compensate for deﬁcits in terms of trafﬁc flow (although the resulting scope is equally
unknown).
In the question of the error compensation capabilities of autonomous automated control
systems, it could prove beneﬁcial to the cause of legal certainty to formulate uniform
requirements targeted to speciﬁc objectives (comparable to brake effectiveness standards
for vehicles, for example) that deﬁne and harmonize the state of the science and tech-
nology. Such a catalog of requirements would presumably bear fruit in the legal deﬁnition
of realistic capability requirements for autonomous control systems.
25.5.5 Communication in Road Traffic
As concerns communication, for road trafﬁc the currently existing options can be assumed.
The use of some vehicle-based light and audible signals—such as headlight flashers, turn
signals and hazard warning lights—if present, is explicitly prescribed by the German Road
Trafﬁc regulations. For example, warning signals (use of the hazard warning light) are
prescribed in the case of hazards with school buses, when passengers get in or out, or as a
warning when approaching the end of a trafﬁc jam, with stalled cars and cars being towed
[see also sections 15, 15a, 16 of the road trafﬁc regulations (StVO)]. Section 5 paragraphs
4a and 5 of the road trafﬁc regulations (StVO) prescribe and allow the use of turn signals
and headlight flashers, respectively, in the context of overtaking maneuvers. The use of
turn signals is prescribed, if available on the vehicle, when turning [section 9 paragraph 1
of the road trafﬁc regulations (StVO)] or starting up [section 10 of the road trafﬁc regu-
lations (StVO)]. Through this standardized, formalized communication, the road trafﬁc
regulations achieve simpliﬁed expectations among other trafﬁc participants [19].
Alongside this, an informal (or not legally secured) use of (light) signals has established
itself which, however, is not envisioned by the road trafﬁc regulations (flashing the high
beams, for instance, can also represent ceding the right ofway to another driver inGermany).
It should be noted, however, that such a use of the signals is no longer subject to the principle
of legitimate expectation in road trafﬁc because it cannot be regarded as “trafﬁc-appropriate”
behavior (and, incidentally, also represents a major risk for misinterpretation).
Immediate verbal communication from within closed vehicles in road trafﬁc is rendered
more difﬁcult or even impossible due to the physical separation of the driver from the
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immediate environment and the noise level of the surroundings. Even informal commu-
nication through simple gestures is considerably compromised due to the reflective effects
of today’s typically tinted and angled vehicle windows. Nevertheless, even the road trafﬁc
regulations offer up an application in the case of “special trafﬁc situations,” which
envisions unspeciﬁed informal communication [as a special legal variant of the duty of
care and consideration in section 1 paragraph 1 of the road trafﬁc regulations (StVO)]. For
instance, if it is necessary to cede the right of way, this requires communication with the
driver yielding the right of way as per section 11 paragraph 3 of the road trafﬁc regulations
(StVO), providing that this communication is conducted in an unambiguous manner—in
exceptional circumstances, even flashing the high beams can thereby be used to further
clarify intent [14].
In view of existing communication challenges (see also Chap. 7), beforehand action, in
particular when expressed in the form of motion, can also represent an indication of the
intended target actions [19], such that the road trafﬁc behavior which can be perceived
from the outside such as stopping, braking and starting up also attain major signiﬁcance in
the context of informal communication. Such conduct is also explicitly envisioned by
section 8, paragraph 2 of the road trafﬁc regulations (StVO), which speciﬁes that in
right-of-way situations, the party required to wait shall “indicate through driving behavior
that he/she will wait.”
Aside from the nonverbal nature and anonymity, the complexity of the situation is also
singled out as a characteristic marginal condition for communication in road trafﬁc. This
complexity is particularly determined by the speed and fleeting nature of the communi-
cation in road trafﬁc [20].
This enables us to identify some initial important conclusions for autonomous driving:
While standardized, formal communication may represent merely a challenge for machine
perception and interpretation and may indeed be possible to program automatically in the
other direction, the question arises at this point already as to the degree to which other
drivers can only recognize automated control or how this could be implemented. Con-
sequently, in the “mixed” communication relationship with machines, the question further
arises whether other drivers would trust the contents of formal communication. This
would at least predicate knowledge of the respective capabilities of autonomous vehicles
in order to allow communicative interaction to function. The case could even arise that
other trafﬁc participants feel a need to reproduce the content of automated communication
(for example after an accident) in order to develop a willingness to trust in
machine-generated communication content.
While the resulting challenges in the case of formal communication appear amenable to
resolution, informal communication in mixed operation is characterized by much greater
challenges [mixed operation is the basis of the present examination (see Chap. 2)]. In this
area there is a need to ﬁnd approaches which would establish a bridge between
machine-controlled vehicles and other trafﬁc participants. Ultimately this conflict flows
from the cause already described in Sect. 25.5, namely that detailed situation-speciﬁc
regulation of communication between human drivers in road trafﬁc is not strictly
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necessary and that implementation can be left to the trafﬁc participants according to
situation. This informal communication between trafﬁc participants may be subject to
conflicts and in need of improvement [20], yet it can still be presumed that drivers are
generally able to resolve this challenge in all situations—not least as this is necessary to
guarantee the situation-speciﬁc adjustment that is required for road trafﬁc in the ﬁrst place.
With the introduction of automated vehicle control, the machines would lack this
human-speciﬁc capability of achieving understanding though such unspeciﬁed means;
indeed, the machine may lack even the capability of recognizing that such communication
is called for. The prerequisite for human communication is establishing a reflexive
attentiveness to the communication partner and mutual perception [19]. This illustrates
clearly that “mixed” communication still requires fundamental approaches for bridging
this communication gap with machines. This would have to be a fundamental prerequisite
in order for a mixed road trafﬁc scenario including human drivers and machine-controlled
vehicles to function.
At the same time, the importance of communication for the implementation of auton-
omous driving can be rated according to how important informal communication proves in
a given situation—an apparently very challenging task from a technical standpoint. The
abovementioned speed and fleeting character of communication in road trafﬁc would
presumably differ signiﬁcantly based on the environmental conditions and driving speeds.
Simply structured, extremely fleeting environmental conditions such as on a highway,
where the driving speeds generally require formal communication, could substantially
simplify the implementation of autonomous driving in that context and minimize the
apparent necessity of adapting autonomous vehicles to the requirements of informal
communication (in comparison to communication needed for an urban trafﬁc
environment).
It may also be assumed that the challenge posed by communication will only occur in
mixed trafﬁc because, particularly between autonomous machines, the problem seems
eminently manageable from a technical standpoint (via cooperative systems). Moreover,
for mixed trafﬁc the signiﬁcance of beforehand action expressed in motion, and how it can
be used for future communication in road trafﬁc, must also be examined. Of particular
interest is the question which situations can be unambiguously resolved by it. At the same
time, there is the risk that an automated driving system—with a set-up designed to take
full account of the error compensation capabilities of other trafﬁc participants (see
Sect. 25.5.4)—could indirectly compromise trafﬁc flow if its conﬁguration were taken
advantage of by other trafﬁc participants.
Finally, it may be concluded with regard to communication in road trafﬁc that here, too,
a catalog of technically implementable communication strategies for autonomous vehicles
in the form of a catalog of requirements would be advisable as soon as technical feasibility
is foreseeable. This summarization of the technical features required of autonomous
vehicles with regard to communication will be necessary over the long term, particularly
in mixed trafﬁc, and could substantially advance the discussion on possible communi-
cation concepts.
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25.5.6 Violations
Through section 24 of the Road Trafﬁc Act as a blanket provision in conjunction with the
regulatory offenses speciﬁed by the road trafﬁc regulations (StVO, section 49), the vehicle
registration regulations (FZV, section 48), the road trafﬁc licensing regulations (StVZO,
section 69a) and driver licensing regulations (FeV, section 75), violations of prohibitions,
duties and orders are generally prosecuted against trafﬁc participants and vehicle owners
[14]. Punishable offenses also include road trafﬁc-related violations from the 28th section
of the criminal code (StGB) on offenses dangerous to public safety (noteworthy in the
present context are external interventions in road trafﬁc as per section 315b StGB and
hazards in road trafﬁc as per section 315c StGB). It is evident that the machine-controlled
conduct of autonomous vehicles would obviate the application of these provisions:
Regulatory offenses and criminal provisions are always linked to a human action, which is
lacking in the autonomous scenario.
The existing regulations, which carry penalties under criminal law or as regulatory
offenses, also have an indicative effect concerning what behavior in road trafﬁc not only
impacts public order, but may, in line with our focus here, especially compromise public
safety. The trafﬁc regulations are “to be handled and interpreted in an elastic
(trafﬁc-appropriate) manner and without pettiness;” this applies equally, in the case of
special regulations, to those which may impede or endanger [14]. Moreover, section 16 of
the law on regulatory offenses provides a standard for legitimate emergency, which
permits actions contrary to the law, including trafﬁc regulations, in cases of acute danger
to life, limb, property or other objects under legal protection in order to prevent imminent
harm. The dangers must be grave, however, and the defensive actions commensurate to
the dangers. Although the respective cases must be handled in a restrictive manner, not
least to prevent specious assertions, this is ultimately a normative instrument to enable an
appropriate consideration of the interests of different objects of legal protection in indi-
vidual cases in a consistent and thus constitutional manner. The violation itself is subject
to the same standard, such that its most extreme limit for road trafﬁc is ultimately deﬁned
by the “danger threshold” for other trafﬁc participants (see [21] on the question of the
consideration of trafﬁc safety in the context of the defense of necessity as a justiﬁcation as
per section 16 of the law on regulatory offenses).
If the introduction of autonomous driving is taken into account against this backdrop, it
may be assumed that the interests would remain unchanged—at least for the mixed trafﬁc
scenario of autonomous and driver-controlled vehicles on which this study is based (see
Chap. 2). A change could occur if—due to a very high degree of automated-system
mastery of the automated control risk associated with a violation—the described con-
sideration ﬁnds that the violation does not result in an increased risk. This would, of
course, call into question the very rationale for the rule itself: “Violation” of the rule
would then not actually produce any disadvantage in the context of mixed trafﬁc.
It is also conceivable, however, that autonomous driving will lead to a need for
considerably more detailed trafﬁc rules which are signiﬁcantly less flexible (which would
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in turn raise the question of societal acceptance again). Such a restriction of the existing
situation would in turn require a more detailed catalog of requirements in terms of the
technical control capability of autonomous vehicles as soon as they become foreseeable
from a technical standpoint. This would make it possible to identify consequences,
including in the case of violations, in much greater detail than is currently possible.
25.6 Special Legal Questions Related to Autonomous Driving
As regards the evaluation of fully-automated, driverless driving in terms of legal regu-
lations and product as well as road trafﬁc liability, the introductory passages on these
issues can be referred to (see Sect. 25.4.2 as well as the introduction to Sect. 25.5). In
summary, the principal conclusion we may draw in this regard is that the legal regulations
and trafﬁc law provisions [in particular the road trafﬁc act (StVG), road trafﬁc regulations
(StVO), road trafﬁc licensing regulations (FeV) and the regulations authorizing the use of
vehicles for road trafﬁc (StVZO)] at the time of their establishment could only consider as
objects of regulation what was known in terms of the state of technology in road trafﬁc. In
all aspects of public road trafﬁc, there is an underlying presumption that a driver will
personally perform vehicle control. It is accordingly true of all available systems that they
do not possess an independent decision-making quality (see Sect. 25.4.1), but indeed
require that the driver be at least “an active monitor” at all times.
25.6.1 Legal Assessment of Driverless Vehicles
If the legal assessment of fully-automated driving [10] is therefore further extended to
completely unmanned vehicles and passengers who are not able to control the vehicles
themselves, clearly there would initially be no change in the present incompatibility with
current regulatory law, which does not take account of this technological development.
At the same time, it must be noted that driverless and completely autonomous vehicles
(see the representative use cases “Autonomous Valet Parking” and “Vehicle on Demand”
in Chap. 2) differ signiﬁcantly in the requirements for the legal framework from those
which call for an “available driver”. With the continued option of vehicle control by the
driver for certain sections of a trip or due to a desire on the driver’s part to take control, the
same fundamental requirements (suitability and competence to drive; see also [18]) must
be fulﬁlled that are currently required of drivers—in the case of “Full Automation Using
Driver for Extended Availability,” at least when the driver intends to make use of the
possibility of controlling the vehicle (i.e. perform an independent act of driving). As such,
there is no need for a fundamentally different legal framework, but simply one augmented
by necessary regulations governing autonomous vehicles and thus an independent,
machine-based decision-making quality. With regard to this independent, machine-based
decision-making quality, then, one arrives at the same result from a legal perspective for
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all of the use cases. The transformation resides primarily in enabling independent, auto-
mated agency and how that is shaped. The framework for automated vehicle control from
a legal standpoint is currently unregulated, although regulation seems called for (at least in
the spirit of road trafﬁc regulations as technically effective regulation).
Insofar as a need for regulation of autonomous vehicles does not emerge naturally from
the novel machine-based automation risk (see Sect. 25.5.1), it would seem that at least in
terms of the use of suitable functions in mixed trafﬁc relating to error compensation (see
Sect. 25.5.4) and communication capabilities (see Sect. 25.5.5) of autonomous vehicles, a
need for legal regulation seems evident. In the legal regulation of such interactive
behavior, it must be examined precisely how far the role of the driver even extends in
individual cases. If one considers the technical capabilities resulting from solely
machine-based mobility in a given case (as described in the “Full Automation Using
Driver for Extended Availability” and “Vehicle On Demand” use cases), the heretofore
fundamental requirements of a driver’s driving suitability and driving competence already
appear superfluous. The manifold possibilities could therefore give rise to an unprece-
dented variety of regulatory duties for participation in road trafﬁc with (autonomous)
vehicles, which could be distinguished primarily by the reach of the automated control
quality and to what extent it is intended to be used.
25.6.2 Evaluation of Autonomous Driving According to Liability
Law in Road Traffic
As concerns the shift towards automated agency which is associated with autonomous
driving, it is likewise the case with road trafﬁc liability law that the existing regulations do
not take account of this change.
25.6.2.1 Keeper Liability
Nevertheless there is in this area a fundamental German liability regulation for motor
vehicles [section 7 of the road trafﬁc act (StVG)] according to which the keeper of the
vehicle, regardless of fault in the operation of the vehicle, is liable for compensation of all
causally related damages which are not asset damages [where the only remaining reason for
exclusion of liability is force majeure, section 7 paragraph 2 of the road trafﬁc act (StVG)].
Thus even today, this restriction to operation of the vehicle as a liability-triggering legal
deﬁnition does not make a distinction based on whether damage was caused by the driver’s
conduct or due to technical failure. Since automated control decisions which cause damage
can without contradiction be classiﬁed as technical failures, there is no fundamental
inconsistency in this regard.
The vehicle keeper is the person who uses the vehicle for his or her own account, in
particular who draws the beneﬁts and pays its expenses and thus also has the authority to
decide regarding its use as a potential source of hazard [14]. If one assumes that driverless
vehicles, too, can be assigned to a keeper, which would be possible without inconsistency
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according to current law, no incompatibility with current law would arise in this case.
Autonomous driving would nevertheless change the matter of keeper responsibility—
however, the keeper responsibility for autonomous driving is already covered by the
wording of the applicable regulation today: The vehicle control previously conducted by
the driver is replaced by an automated vehicle control system (as far as the scope of
application of the respective autonomous control reaches). Concerning the keeper
responsibility, therefore, there would be no new duties, but rather a completely different
control quality which triggers civil liability.
25.6.2.2 Driver Liability and Accident Data Recording
Other regulations of the road trafﬁc act which are relevant for civil liability do, however,
clearly assume control by a driver, for example section 18 paragraph 1 of the road trafﬁc
act (StVG), according to which in cases of keeper liability a liability on the part of the
driver is likewise presumed (see clause 2). Thus we see that section 18 of the German road
trafﬁc act (StVG) also merely assumes the heretofore always correct presumption that a
driver is always responsible for the control behavior of the vehicle. Ultimately the
assessment of driverless vehicles from a liability law perspective does not differ sub-
stantially from fully-automated [10] vehicles. The situation is similar with the heretofore
applicable provisions of the German Civil Code (BGB) covering unlawful behavior by
drivers (e.g. section 823 paragraph 1 BGB or section 823 paragraph 2 BGB in conjunction
with violations of the road trafﬁc regulations): These provisions can no longer cover the
case of automated agency because they are linked to human action which is not applicable
to autonomous vehicles.
In the autonomous vehicles which are the subject of this study, which in some cases do
not even require the presence or occasional assumption of control by a driver, the question
must be addressed to what extent it may be assumed in a typical case that vehicle pas-
sengers will be capable of describing the course of an accident. This illustrates that with
respect to the question of compensation of accident damages occurring between two or
more autonomous vehicles, the apportionment of damages according to applicable law and
thus section 17 of the road trafﬁc act (StVG) is confronted with the problem that the
principally applied “degree of causation” [14] no longer—as is commonly the case today—
can at least be supported through hearing of the drivers (generally also parties to a civil case
—as the case may be also witnesses). This is due primarily to the role change in which the
driver becomes a “mere passenger” (see Chap. 2) and is therefore able to make statements
regarding the course of an accident only in exceptional cases and only on the basis of
chance observations. Thus a change is introduced which even with respect to liability law
in road trafﬁc would seem to require technical measures (such as crash data recording
during automated vehicle control) as a basis for the corresponding damage apportionment,
insofar as the desire exists to maintain this distribution principle according to shares of
causation for autonomous driving as well (which does indeed seem possible).
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25.6.3 Evaluation with Respect to Product Liability Law
The ﬁeld of product liability for automated control of autonomous vehicles was already
discussed in Sect. 25.5.1. The salient question here is determination of the relevant cause
of accident damage in individual cases in the sense of scientiﬁc causality.
25.6.3.1 Significance of Accident Data Recordings in Autonomous
Driving in Terms of Product Liability Law
Going further, for the cases of autonomous driving which require a “driver for extended
availability” (see the use cases “Interstate Pilot Using Driver for Extended Availability”
and “Full Automation Using Driver for Extended Availability” Chap. 2) there is another
aspect which in turn stands in relation to the question of crash data recorders. Both in
terms of product liability law (as well as with regard to violations of regulatory law subject
to ﬁnes) it seems reasonable to assume that an active available driver could argue the
exculpatory defense that he/she was not controlling the vehicle him/herself, but with the
aid of the autonomous control system. If one wishes to preclude such assertions, it will be
difﬁcult to avoid considering the recording of vehicle control data—at least during
autonomous control—in order both to protect the interests of the manufacturers in terms of
product liability law and to secure evidence with respect to regulatory violations. This
option does not seem excluded a priori from a data protection standpoint provided that the
data remains in the vehicle, the transparency requirement is granted and data processing is
conducted only to the extent necessary, or that data is, for example, only permanently
stored in the event of accident damage. Moreover, a restriction of data recording to the
period in which the vehicle was under automated control would have to be considered
which would meet the principle of data minimization [section 3 of the German Data
Protection Act (BDSG)], which incidentally would equally arise from the principle of
proportionality with regard to data processing. This would also largely avoid the recording
of behavior related data on the driver’s control of the vehicle. Particular attention would
also have to be given to the transitions between the respective periods in which the driver
and the automated control system are driving. Data recording could be of particular
importance in this transition period, although it would simultaneously deal with data
clearly related to the driver. As such, it would be necessary to clarify in an initial step the
extent of recording required for a driver-controlled drive to protect against subsequent
exculpatory defenses.
25.6.3.2 The State of Science and Technology in Autonomous Driving
From a product liability law perspective, the signiﬁcant aspect for the layman would
appear to be the question of exclusion of liability for errors in the context of automated
vehicle control which the latest science and technology cannot identify at the time of
introduction (development risk). In this context of product liability law, we must return to
the question raised in Sect. 25.5.1 in which it appears possible in the context of road trafﬁc
that risks which manifest themselves in accidents could also be traced back to the current
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trafﬁc system as a relevant cause (and not in all cases to the control behavior, whether by
drivers or automated control systems). This question is fundamental and needs to be
answered as a matter of priority in order to avoid erroneously inferring that (alleged)
product defects are the relevant cause.
But as soon as the grounds for exemption from liability are affected in view of the state
of science and technology, it must be taken into account that this exemption in practice is
of decidedly minor signiﬁcance. Whether a hazard was indeed recognizable according to
the state of science and technology is to be tested in two steps: First, it must be established
whether the error was recognizable for any scientist or engineer in the world. If that was
the case, claiming the exemption is still not yet ruled out, because the decisive factor
would be the objective accessibility of that knowledge for the manufacturer. It would also
be necessary to take into consideration deviating opinions by individual scientists, pro-
vided that those opinions satisfy the minimum requirements for scientiﬁc work [22].
As such, it is equally critical to determine for autonomous vehicles whether the rec-
ognizability of an error could indeed be ruled out at the time of introduction (which indeed
would also have to be provable in retrospect in the event of an accident according to the
applicable standards of presentation and proof in civil suits). Only in this rare case would
the manufacturer gain legal certainty through the use of these grounds for exemption of
the development risk [and if not at fault, also according to section 823 paragraph 1 of the
German Civil Code (BGB)]. In practice, this case will be of nearly no importance.
Cognizance of the fact that product defects cannot be entirely ruled out even according
to the latest science and technology and the observance of all due care, i.e. that a “residual
fault tolerance”—as the ISO 26262 standard words it—exists, must be regarded as a
technical description of the development process which has no correlation in product
liability law.
25.6.4 Possible Differences of Legal Evaluation
in the International Context
First, it must be noted that the present chapter from the outset only considers the situation
from the perspective of German law and makes assertions on the basis of German law
currently in force. Applicability to other countries must be considered limited. Transfer-
ability of the conclusions here will, aside from coincidental reasons, be most likely in the
event of harmonization of laws due to international agreements (in the context of inter-
national law) or through regulations and directives issued in the context of EU law.
It is therefore salient to add that, as concerns the fundamental rights situation depicted
here, there is a largely concordant standard of fundamental rights—for our present pur-
poses in the context of the German fundamental rights to life and physical integrity—
recognized for example through the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. It
bears references to the European Convention on Human Rights and, with the exception of
the United Kingdom and Poland, the EU fundamental rights charter was declared binding
25 Fundamental and Special Legal Questions for Autonomous Vehicles 547
for the countries of the European Union through a provision in the Treaty of Lisbon. The
rights to life and physical integrity are explicitly recognized therein—in particular through
article 2 paragraph 1 and article 3 paragraph 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union (see also [23]). This interpretation could be extended almost at will to the
constitutions of other states; the chief conclusion, however, is that the fundamental rights
framework can differ signiﬁcantly in many individual areas. Such an examination is
therefore the realm of specialists in the respective legal contexts.
This applies equally to the regulatory law of road trafﬁc as well as to the liability law
being applied which is relevant for autonomous driving. But as we have seen in
Sects. 25.6.1 and 25.6.2, the legal situation according to German law is to a great extent
only transferable to autonomous driving to a very limited degree. It seems quite possible
that a comparable situation would subsist in other legal systems as well. This assumption
is also supported by the fact that international road trafﬁc accords such as the Vienna
Convention on Road Trafﬁc of 1968 and the Geneva Convention on Road Trafﬁc of 1949
are based on a deﬁnition of the driver and continuous vehicle control which is highly
comparable to that of the German road trafﬁc regulations.
In the interest of greater comparability, the product liability law which was harmonized
within the European Union through council directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 rates a
mention. Here again, in addition to restrictions in terms of legal doctrine, uncertainties
arise due to the fact that the directive’s implementation is binding only with regard to the
objective (a principle that existed even prior to the current situation and which ﬁnds
expression today in article 288 paragraph of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union). Yet there is a comparable legal foundation for intra-state application which
is not linked to culpability (so-called strict liability).
In sum, it can be concluded that in these areas, there are still signiﬁcant differences
which could impact the development of autonomous driving. Due to the national variations
within the ﬁeld of law, however, the impact cannot be predicted in detail and remains—as
far as can be ascertained today—in need of further examination.
25.6.5 Special Question: Supervisory Duty with Regard
to the Passengers of Autonomous Vehicles
One of the beneﬁts of autonomous driving is that the attention resources of the human
occupant are no longer required for the task of driving. This could potentially call into
question the necessity of the presence of the “driver,” or indeed the personwith a supervisory
duty at all. Thus a signiﬁcant beneﬁt of autonomous driving could be that themobility desires
of children—without requiring a driver—could be fulﬁlled. It is therefore by no means
impossible that dangers could arise from this if—as presumably would often be the case—
the driver is the person with a supervisory duty who is no longer present in the vehicle.
However, of the representative use cases examined here, only the “vehicle on demand”
case would appear suitable for performing such a transport activity without the
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accompaniment of a person with a supervisory duty. Even the representative use case
“Full Automation Using Driver for Extended Availability” calls for the presence of a
driver to drive in zones or sections of roads not approved for autonomous driving (see
Chap. 2). Since the “Vehicle on Demand” representative use case does not even have a
driver’s seat (but only a completely freely-usable interior space), dangers and effects
flowing from use by persons requiring supervision would seem to be limited to the interior
of the vehicle and not relevant for road trafﬁc. Thus the question of the absence of the
person with the supervisory duty would not be relevant for road trafﬁc. It is, however,
every bit as plausible that such autonomous vehicles would indeed have driving controls.
In that case there would be the possibility of a signiﬁcant negative influence over vehicle
control by means of overriding the autonomous driving functions through the control
elements.
It is clear, however, that the legal question of a duty to supervise does not depend on
the introduction of autonomous driving. Indeed, even today independent compensation
obligations can be triggered by violations of the duty to supervise [see section 832 of the
German Civil Code (BGB)]. The law stipulates a parental duty to supervise children in the
exercise of parental care, sections 1626 and following BGB. Thus it would be necessary to
determine the intensity of supervision required in view of the predictability of damaging
conduct in an individual case based on the age, maturity, character, knowledge and
abilities of a child [24]. If the resulting duty is violated and damage occurs on account of
it, an independent claim for damages (aside from any claims lodged against the child)
could be leveled against the parents of the child as well. Thus the possibilities arising from
the advent of autonomous vehicles could result in the correct fulﬁllment of supervisory
duties in this context receiving a novel, heretofore completely unknown meaning. A need
to alter the legal basis is not foreseeable, however.
25.7 Conclusion
The examination of autonomous driving from a legal perspective undertaken in the pre-
sent chapter reveals—in addition to the questions raised in the respective subsections—in
particular a fundamental aspect which may take on greater prominence in the context of
the transition from human to automated vehicle control than was previously the case. Even
if we were to assume today that every accident involving motor vehicles were due to faults
in the control of the vehicle, it must be examined scientiﬁcally to what extent the current
trafﬁc system, in view of the conditions under which it operates, does not itself represent a
relevant cause for some portion of the accidents which take place today. The answer to the
question is not to be regarded as an end in itself, but as a means of understanding whether,
and if so, which changes in the vehicle control scenario are suitable under certain con-
ditions to prevent accidents. This question is also decisive for the design of a safe product
from the manufacturer’s point of view in terms of developing appropriate autonomous
machine-based control functions.
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It would also appear that the description of an automated control quality in the sense of
a deﬁnition of requirements will be an important milestone in the ongoing advancement of
autonomous driving in terms of legal certainty both for the operator of the vehicles as well
as their manufacturers. This could be the basis for an evaluation that determines precisely
in which areas there is a need for further development such as the communication or error
compensation capabilities of autonomous vehicles. On the other hand, it would allow for
an assessment of how the corresponding legal framework must be designed in order to
make a functioning “road trafﬁc system” involving autonomous vehicles a reality.
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